Nomads are positioned outside of the modern conception of nations, which is based on a traditional or modern hierarchical model (Kuzio 2001) which tends to "dehistoricize and essentialize tradition" (Chatterjee 2010: 169). Using an analysis of the narrative construction of nomadic Kalmyk nationhood, particularly through historiography and culture, it demonstrates that in spite of nation-destroying efforts from the Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union, the Kalmyk nation has been flexible with reinventing cultural strategies in charting the nomadic national imaginary from Chinggis Khan to the Dalai Lama. It argues that nomadic nationhood contains a deeply imaginary response to nomads' cultural and intellectual milieu which provided a way of freeing itself from Tsarist and Soviet modular narratives of national imagination, demonstrating how nomadic nationhood exists as a non-modular form of nationhood.
Introduction
With cultural and political identities which transcend fixed territorial boundaries, nomadic populations have always represented an obstacle to efforts of state consolidation (Scott 1999) . Attempts to anchor the nomads resemble Walker Connor's (1994) idea of 'nationdestroying' which occurs when states seek to consolidate and assimilate varying groups residing within its territorial borders. The claims to the right of nomadic nationhood, sovereignty, and territoriality are not the focus of existing nomadic studies and neither has much consideration been given to the forms and dynamics of nomadic nationhood in respect to nationalism studies.
Yet, nomadic forms of nationhood have been writ large in the process of nation formation in different regional contexts and our understanding of nomadic conceptions of nationhood have been limited. This article seeks rectify this by offering an interpretative account of nomadic nationhood through an analysis of the narrative construction of nomadic Kalmyk nationhood by focusing on Kalmyk historiography and culture.
The Republic of Kalmykia is a steppe region of modern nomads, the remnants of the Mongolian Empire in South European Russia. Despite the geographic (nearly 6,000 km) and political isolation (over four centuries) from Mongolia (including Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, and Buryatia), Kalmyks sustained, though with a different degree of success, their political autonomy, demographic balance, and culture. Perhaps no other modern population in Europe or Russia has been linked to the native Mongolian transcontinental governance of Chinggis Khan as closely as the Kalmyk nomads. Positioned between the Manchu and Moscow rising powers, Kalmyks, known as Western Mongols (Jungars) and Oirats (in medieval and early modern historiography), were the last nomads who held transcontinental sovereign power in the Eurasian steppe (Kolesnik 2003 , Perdue 2005 . The essence of nomadic nationhood (sometimes well as Crimean Tatars, Kazan Tatars, and Kalmyk-Mongols in the name of Russia. These observations, which perceive their nation and the state as two distinct entities, are neither weak nor merely outliers in the analysis of nations and nationalism. Rather, these observations need to be included in the analysis if we are to assume that nations are a generalizable social phenomenon beyond the sedentary world. Connor (1994: 42) argued that theories of 'nation-building' tend to present the matter of national identities, including the claims to the right of self-determination, superficially as a minor obstacle to effective state integration. The semantic ambivalence between 'state' and 'nation' substantiates the improper utilization of the key term 'nation-building' when instead it is 'state integration' with the true goal of 'nation-destroying. ' The distinction between state and nation is clearly manifested in the nomadic cultural resilience against 'nation-destroying' by the Tsarist and Soviet state policies.
Nomadic nations are defined here, beyond the tangible characteristics (a common descent, language, religion, territory, etc.), as "a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all nonmembers in a most vital way" (Connor 1994: 197) . The durability of conviction of being a nomadic nation stems not from an 'identity' but instead from 'difference' (Chatterjee 1993: 5) with the 'modular narratives' of nations and nationalisms prescribed by the Tsarist and Soviet (hereafter Russian) state regimes.3
In this article, the emphasis on the process of nation-destroying instead of nation-building highlights critical aspects of the different catalysts to which nomadic consciousness responds with cultural ingenuity for national survival. Fuelled by the state's modular narrative, a nationdestroying bureaucratic machine gradually takes control of nomadic nations through the removal of the nomadic ownership of symbolic cultural narration. Despite the Russian modular interpretation of nations, the Mongol-Turkic nations and their distinct national identity came into existence long before the fall of imperial power or transferal from Tsarist to Soviet and postSoviet regimes. The contemporary nations of Eurasia were the result of both nation-destroying, through a modular narrative of imagined identities, and the cultural resilience of a nomadic narrative of imagined difference.
The article is divided into three main sections. The first outlines how the Russians and Soviets understood nomadic nationhood. The article begins with the argument that past research of nomadism only works from a modernisation perspective. Nomads are positioned outside of the domain of modern nations, which is based on a traditional/modern hierarchical trap (Kuzio 2001) to "dehistoricize and essentialize tradition" (Chatterjee 2010: 169) . Past accounts describe the Kalmyks as tribal people in perpetual transition, never fully reaching a more civilised, Christianised, urbanised, industrialised condition (Kolesnik 2003 , Perdue 2005 . In this sociopolitical formula, Kalmyks are viewed as nomads who are not capable of governing and building their versions of states and nations. However, nomadic writings and archaeological evidence challenge this perspective suggesting the Mongol-Tatar imperial origin of modern nation-states in Eurasia. Nomadic governance and institutions persisted long after the nomadic empire disintegrated.
The second section discusses how the Kalmyk nomads narrated their nomadic nationhood conveying the myths of territorial affinity with the Great Steppe of the nomads, as well as political practices of statehood, organisational knowledge, governing models, and symbolic traditions. The third section highlights the Tsarist and Soviet regimes deliberate process of nation-destroying where their aim was to marginalize the distinct nomadic culture and silence nomadic political claims of nationhood. It is important to note that the Tsarist and Soviet nationality policies targeted not only the Kalmyk nomads. Other minorities were persecuted and displaced. Thus, Kalmykia is not the only case of nation-destroying, but rather nation-destroying is revealed through this one particular case study of Kalmykia. The case of Kalmykia raises larger issues in the debate on nationhood by highlighting that 'being a nation' does not mean being a static and fixed entity, but rather a continually changing psychological force of conviction that depends on the dynamic tension between the narration practices of nationdestroying knowledge and the cultural resilience through a nation-narration of imagined difference.
A re-examination of nations from the position of nomadic narration sheds light on the cultural limitations of our understanding of nations and nationalisms in contemporary politics.
The misinterpretation of understandings of nomadic nationhood can be related to some conflicts that arise in respect of contemporary claims of self-determination in disputed centre-periphery conflicts in the post-Chinggisid Eurasia such as in Xinjiang4, Tibet5 and Tatar Crimea6. Hence, it 4 After the disintegration of Chinggis Khan's Empire, Jungar [Western Mongol] leaders held power in steppe, including Xinjiang, until the destruction of the Jungar Khanate by the Manchu empire in 1760. The Jungar land, including the area of Xinjiang, was left empty for a state-sponsored social and demographic expansion. 5 Compared to the massacre policies toward the Jungars, the Manchu leaders did not eliminate completely the Tibetan lamas of the Yellow Teaching (Perdue 2005: 285) . The nation-destroying policies in Tibet were postponed until 1959 when the Dalai Lama fled his country from the Chinese Communist regime. 6 In 1783, Empress Catherine II declared the end of the Crimean Khanate, a successor of the Mongol-Tatar Horde. The Khanate's territories were annexed into a new re-imagined social space 'Tavrida Oblast' under the Greek Herodotus toponymy project of the Russian colonial imagination (Hakan Kirimli 1996) . becomes important to recognize the 'anchoring' signs of the state against the signs of nomadic nations and their proclaimed sovereignty. Our understanding of nations will benefit from the analysis of the modular stability of cultural and political institutions that operate on the traditional assumptions of the sedentary narrative (Bhabha 1990) . In positioning the debate from the contrasting narrative of nomadic nations allows us to articulate the crossing and interdependence of cultural boundaries.
Russian and Soviet understanding of nomadic nationhood
Past research on the varieties of modernisation of nomads by sedentary states acknowledged the deficiencies of modernisation theory as a sedentary narrative of socioeconomic and political development, which was ascribed to other nations (Ginat and Khazanov 1998, Kradin 1992) . Nevertheless, scholars have still suggested nomads "must be accepted as full-fledged citizens of modernising states" and "benefit from their membership in society at large" (Ginat and Khazanov 1998: 3) . Moreover, they have argued, that -despite the detrimental paternalistic policies toward nomads that doomed them to be economically and politically dependent -nomads "can not be left alone" and "their own resources are too meagre to be sufficient for spontaneous modernisation" (Ginat and Khazanov 1998: 3) . The cultural complexity of nomads is commonly measured against the cultural performance indicators of sedentary societies, such as fixed residence, urbanization, a density of population, and technological specialization (Kradin 2006) . Despite these methodological limitations, hidden narratives highlight the nomadic cultural ingenuity in their national adaptation over time under the pressures of technological advancement (Perdue 2005: 21) . Russia as a source of negative influence, violence, and distortion (Dode 2001 , Gallyamova 2014 ). For example, despite the fact that in 1907-10 Gorodtsev and Prozritelev found valuable archaeological materials among the ruins of the Mongol-Tatar city Madjar, all the archaeological research projects on the 13 th -and 14 th centuries nomadic culture were stopped for almost a century (Babenko 2001) . The costumes of a young elite couple discoveries in the kurgan [hill] cemetery Djukhta-2, the Mongol-Tatar commercial centre of the Khanate of Juchi, combined with the Kalmyk epic narrative "Janghar" document Kalmyk nomadic cultural preferences, artistic styles and luxury possessions typical of this period (Dode 2001 (Dode , 2005 . However, what is significant, in the context of this study, is not just the symbolic meaning behind the archaeological artefacts, but rather the evidence of the state's deliberate attempts to silence nomadic claims of nationhood. 6. The Central Eurasian steppe belt is not the locality of nomadic culture. All archaeological discoveries are strictly censured (Dode 2001 , Babenko 2001 ).
What these elements of the modular narrative share is an imagination that nomads exist outside of the domain of modern nations. The relegation of nomads to the sphere of the traditional within this confined paradigm ensured the narrative was an effective and powerful instrument for the exercise of control of the vast territories of the Eurasian continent. The analysis of Kalmyk nationhood outside of these teleological linear interpretations (from traditional to modern, from bandits to tribes to chiefdoms, from nomadic to sedentary) enables us to conceptualize nomads without denying the historical possibility of cultural institutions and values that might not conform to the Christian, Communist, and post-Communist sedentary principles. We argue that the Kalmyk ingenuity of nomadic national survival stems not from a national identity based on these linear understandings of nationhood, but rather from a cultural difference within a modular narrative of controlled imagination. The myths of descent, golden age of civilization, and heroes of war and peace in readings of nationhood (Smith 1986 ) embody the imagined difference of an evolving Kalmyk culture that has sought its own ways of coping with modernity and freeing itself from a Russian modular narrative of controlled imagination.
How did the Kalmyks understand themselves as a nomadic nation?
In (Smith 1986 ). The intensity and political importance of nomadic sentiments are discussed here against symbolic contents of the nation-destroying modular narrative of the Russian and Soviet state regimes.
Myths of Descent
The nation-destroying modular narrative dictates that Kalmyk alliances are unstable, 'The Oirats are one of the best known of the Mongol tribes, and to that tribe belong most of the maternal uncles of the children and grand-children of Chinggis Khan, the reason being that at the time of his first rise to power the Oirats came forward to support and assist him and vied with one another in their alacrity to tender allegiance, and in recognition of their services an edict was issued concerning that tribe to the effect that the daughters of their emirs should be married to the descendants of Chinggis Khan.'
The Oirat Emir Arghun Aqa administratively shaped the western lands of the Mongol Empire.
As a professor of history at Miami University Judith Kolbas (2006) highlighted, Arghun Aqa had military, financial and, above all, political acumen that allowed him to have his finger on the pulse of every major event for thirty-two years. Moreover, Mongol power in its transcontinental scale cannot be understood without appreciating his immense role in establishing it (Kolbas 2006 ).
These nomadic counter-narratives, through the bibliographic description of these key figures, provide the perspective from the nomads themselves, suggesting that the Eurasian nomads were not only positioned to build, govern, and operate transcontinental early empires, but also were culturally complex and politically capable of building their versions of modern states and nations. In the process of cultural construction, nomadic nations sought heroes of war and peace of transcontinental scale to inspire and guide them through the times of modern disenchantment.
Written Records
By the end of the 16th century, the Torgut hereditary princes gained power in the Dorben-Oirat Confederation. The name Tourgout means 'elite guard troops' of the Mongol Khans, reflecting Chinggis Khan's effective social transformation of a nomadic society from familial ties to decimal military units (Guchinova 2006 , Avlyaev 1984 (Golstunskiy 1880 , Badmaev 1968 , Guchinova 2006 ). This
Kalmyk historical literature highlights that nation-narration is never complete. This inevitably bred a reaction among the Kalmyk intellectuals to intensify a unified Kalmyk language and historical literature. In the process of nation narration, not only must nomads be founded upon the nomadic cultural core; they must also update their nation-narration within a nomadic cultural structure.
Legislature
The Eurasian nomads continued to maintain their political and cultural practices in accordance with Chinggis Khan's governing system long after their nomadic empire had disintegrated. Since the times of Chinggis Khan, nomadic governance consisted of the legislative (khurultai), executive (khan), and judicial (zargo) branches. The khurultai (the All Nomadic Congress) played a great role among all nomadic nations. The most important political decisions were resolved by the khurultai-congress that served as "an organ maintaining the state" (Arapov 2003: 158; Gurliand 1904) . Khurultai-congresses enacted legislation, rejected or confirmed the Khans, authorized major coalitions and wars.
It is important to stress that the laws and practices of the Mongol empire were not only well codified but also more advanced than comparable laws of other nations. The legislative structure protected the rights of women, migrants and religious minorities, as well as supported a merit-based professional service and the advancement of sciences. Jean de Joinville (Smith 2008 ), a chronicler of medieval France, emphasised that the Yasa law code declared the death penalty for sexual misconduct or harassment of a Mongol woman regardless of the marital status, ensuring woman's security and social order during their peaceful migrations and military expeditions. The Yasa also ordered to support individuals of certain professions and exempt them from taxes. These professions were "lawyers, doctors, scientists, people who were fully dedicated to religions and funeral services" (Gurliand 1904; Vernadskiy 1953) . The power of the Nation-narration is never without a hero (Smith 1986 ) and nomadic nation-narration is never without a heroic khan. The rise of Ayuka the Khan enhanced the myth of national creativity and durability: the nomads once capable of leading transcontinental governing systems and creating agents of governance like Arghun-Aqa, Bolad-Aqa, Zaya-Pandita, must have human capabilities to create heroic khans like Ayuka and future treasures of governance. While khan was an important symbol of the nomadic governance, not every khan was a national hero. The significance of a heroic khan in his own locality of the Great Steppe and among his nomadic community lies in his role to sum up a nomadic cultural milieu, which in its highest moments exerted a powerful appeal to sovereign unity free from external constraints.
Nation-destroying
After Ayuka-Khan's death in 1724, the Kalmyk political elite became increasingly concerned with the Russian state's interference in the internal affairs of the Kalmyk khanate, especially in the election process of the next Khan (Bichurin 1834: 189) . In collaboration with
Ayuka's wife Darma-Bala, the Russian state confirmed Tseren-Donduk as first in line to succession, who was one of Ayuka's weakest sons and was known for his alcoholic tendencies.
However, the Kalmyk legislative members unanimously confirmed their own candidate DondukOmbo, Ayuka-Khan's grandson.
Political instability, and tension between the two candidates, continued until 1735 when Tseren-Donduk could not resist the pressure from the Kalmyk political elite anymore. After almost ten years, Donduk-Ombo returned from exile in Kuban. Within two years, Donduk-Ombo brought military and economic stability to the region and in 1757 he earned the title of sovereign, Donduk-Ombo-the Khan (Bichurin 1834: 219) . However, the political stability of the Kalmyk Khanate did not last long. The Russian state intensified the colonial regime through the policies of Christianization, crime forgiveness, mass relocation of Russian villagers to the Kalmyk pastures, and the restructuring of the Zargo judicial institution (Pozdneev 1886 , Kostenko 1870 .
In 1771, Kalmyks seeking to escape the Russian state decided to migrate from the European part of Russia to Western Mongolia. Khodarkovsky (1992: 232) 
The rise of the intelligentsia
In Soviet Kalmykia, the nomadic transmission of cultural values shifted from the institution of the Dalai Lama to the moral stratum of intellectuals and professional specialists.
Two leaders became collective agents in the revival of the nation: the poet David Kugutinov 1922 ) and the General Gorodovikov (1910 . Both stressed Kalmyks' cultural uniqueness and political sovereignty.
The distinction between the rational state policies and the non-rational core of the national identity was expressed in a poem written by David Kugultinov in his response to
Stalin's deportation of the Kalmyks to Siberia. In 1944 Kugultinov was convicted by clause 58/10 for his nationalist poetry and was sent to Norilsk State Special Regime Camp in Siberia.
The poem "I have not renounced the truth [that I am Kalmyk]" became a cultural symbol of the Kalmyk national resistance against the Russian attempt to destroy the Kalmyk nation.
I have not renounced the truth
At that time unjust and savage rule 
Conclusion
The forms and dynamics of nomadic nationhood represent an important category of contemporary geopolitics and are the outcomes of both developments: nation destroying, through a modular narrative of controlled imagination, and cultural resilience, through a nomadic narrative of imagined difference. Nations, using Connor's (1994: 197) definition as "a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all nonmembers in a most vital way," are also determined by the cultural intermediaries between the nomadic imaginary community and the wider imaginary world of moral humanity. Nomadic nation-narration presents the intricate plot of a myth of honour and humanity, embedded inside the determinist structure of nationhood that, from the hero of war Chinggis Khan to the hero of peace Dalai Lama, contains a deeply imaginary response to nomads' cultural and intellectual trajectory and resonates with the broader moral audience. This study demonstrates that nomadic nations are extremely adaptable to power conditions, flexible with reinventing cultural ideas and governing strategies, and determined by the cultural intermediaries between the nomadic imaginary community and the wider imaginary world.
The absence of the nomadic actors in the global discourse of nationhood adds to the debate on nations, as Bhabha (1990) and Chatterjee (1993) The engagement in the so-called "Great Game" (Clubb 1971) which is re-enacted through the Russian "Eurasianism" policy, the Chinese "Belt and Road" strategic initiative, and the US "New Afghanistan War Strategy" poses predictable traps to the Russian-Sino-American triangle in the region known as the "graveyard of empires." The outcome of these strategic manoeuvrings will inevitably benefit from attention to the cultural and political institutions of the nomadic players and their construction of nation-narration. Their inclusion may ensure greater regional stability by preventing cultural misinterpretation, conflict, and the attendant economic burden and loss of human life.
